Updates of Nonmonotonic Knowledge Bases.

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Abstract

The dynamic aspects of knowledge representation has been tackled recently by a variety of approaches in the logic programming style. We consider the approaches characterized by the causal rejection principle (if there is a conflict between rules, then more preferred rules override those less preferred). A classification and a comparison of the approaches is presented in the paper. We compare them also to our own approach based on Kripke structures.

1 Introduction

A theoretical investigation of dynamic aspects of knowledge representation is presented in this paper. Our attention is focused on the evolving knowledge bases. The changes may be caused by the flow of time, by a new information obtained from a different sources or by a new point of view. The problems of changing and integrating information in modular, multiple-sourced, and dynamic knowledge bases are of crucial importance for the theory of knowledge representation and reasoning.

Recently the problem of evolving knowledge bases has been tackled by a variety of approaches in the logic programming style, see [6, 2] and others. A detailed and comprehensive information is available in [5]. The presented model consists of a set of logic programs (each of them represents a module of the knowledge base) and of a preference relation on modules. The preference relation is a dynamic one – some events in the environment can change it. The conflicts between the modules are resolved according to the preference relation. The main attention has been devoted to the conflicts between rules. They are resolved according to the causal rejection principle: if there is a conflict between rules, then more preferred rules override those less preferred.

Goals of this paper are

- to introduce a point of view useful for a classification of the approaches based on the causal rejection principle,
- to compare them to our approach [8, 9].

The paper is structured as follows: Technical prerequisites are presented in the Section 2. Two basic types of rules rejection (those of [1] and [2]) are described in the Section 3. Then, in the Section 4 two strategies of accepting the default assumptions (when updating) are described. We combined them with the strategies of rule rejection and obtained four types of semantics of logic program updates. The relations between these four types are summarized. Finally, our approach, based on a Kripkean semantics is compared to the approaches based on the causal rejection principle.

2 Preliminaries

Consider a set of propositional symbols (atoms) $\mathcal{A}$. A *literal* is an atom (a positive literal) or an atom preceded by the default negation (a negative literal), *not* A. The set $\{notA : A \in \mathcal{A}\}$ will be denoted by $\mathcal{D}$ (defaults, assumptions). For each atom A, A and *not* A are called *conflicting literals*. A set of literals is called *consistent*, if it does not contain a pair of conflicting literals. A convention as follows is used: if literal L is of the form *not* A, where $A \in \mathcal{A}$, then *not* $L = A$.

A *rule* is a formula r of the form $L \leftarrow L_1, \ldots, L_k$, where $k \geq 0$, and L, L_i are literals (for each i). We will denote L also by $head(r)$ and the set of literals $\{L_1, \ldots, L_k\}$ by $body(r)$. If $body(r) = \emptyset$, then r is called a *fact*. The subset of all positive (negative) literals of $body(r)$ is denoted by $body^+(r)$ ($body^-(r)$). For each rule r we denote the rule $head(r) \leftarrow body^+(r)$ by r^+. We say that two rules, r and r', are *conflicting rules* if $head(r) = not\ head(r')$, notation: $r \bowtie r'$.

The set of all rules (over $\mathcal{A}$) forms the language $\mathcal{L}$. A finite subset of $\mathcal{L}$ is called a *generalized logic program* (program hereafter).

A *partial interpretation* of the language $\mathcal{L}$ is a consistent set of literals. The set of all partial interpretations of the language $\mathcal{L}$ is denoted by $Int_{\mathcal{L}}$. A *total interpretation* is a partial interpretation I such that for each $A \in \mathcal{A}$ either $A \in I$ or *not* $A \in I$. Sometimes it will be convenient to speak about interpretations and sets of facts interchangeably. For this reason, we introduce the notation as follows: Let M be an interpretation, then $rule(M) = \{L \leftarrow : L \in M\}$.

We accept a convention as follows: All programs use only propositional symbols from $\mathcal{A}$. Interpretations of all programs are subsets of $Int_{\mathcal{L}}$.

A literal L is *satisfied* in a partial interpretation I if $L \in I$. A set of literals S is satisfied in a partial interpretation I if each literal $L \in S$ is satisfied in I. A rule r is satisfied in a partial interpretation I if $head(r)$ is satisfied in I whenever $body(r)$ is satisfied in I. Notation: $I \models L$, $I \models S$, $I \models r$.

A *total* interpretation I is a *model* of a program P if each rule $r \in P$ is satisfied in I.

Notice that (propositional generalized logic) programs may be treated as Horn theories: each literal *not* A may be considered as a new propositional symbol. The least model of a Horn theory H is denoted by $least(H)$.

Definition 1 (Stable model, [1]) Let P be a program and S be a total interpretation. Let $S^- = \{not\ A \in S : A \in \mathcal{A}\}$.

Then S is a *stable model* of P iff $S = least(P \cup rule(S^-))$. □

Some basic recent semantic characterizations of logic program updates are summarized (and classified) in next two sections. Our attention is focused on two approaches: (multidimensional) dynamic logic programming (MDyLoP) [6, 5] and the approach of Eiter and his group [2]. Both approaches use the idea of causal rejection principle in order to resolve the conflicts between programs.

In the framework of MDyLoP the language of generalized logic programs is used, while [2] uses the language of extended logic programs. In this paper only the language of generalized logic programs and the framework of multidimensional dynamic logic programming is used. We incorporate some ideas of [2] into this framework.

Multidimensional dynamic logic program is defined as a set of generalized logic programs together with a preference relation on the programs [6]. A specification of the relation can be based on the edges of a graph.

Definition 2 ([6]) A *multidimensional dynamic logic program* (also *multiprogram* hereafter) is a pair $(\mathcal{P}, G)$, where $G = (V, E)$ is an acyclic digraph, $|V| \geq 2$, and $\mathcal{P} = \{P_v : v \in V\}$ is a set of generalized logic programs.

We denote by $v_i \prec v_j$ that there is a directed path from v_i to v_j and $v_i \preceq v_j$ means that $v_i \prec v_j$ or $i = j$. If $v_i \prec v_j$, we say that P_{v_j} is *more preferred* than P_{v_i}.

We denote the set of programs $\{P_{v_i} : v_i \preceq s\}$ by $\mathcal{P}_s$. □

If G is a directed path, the multidimensionality is collapsed and we speak simply about dynamic logic programs. The elementary case is represented by $V = \{u, v\}$ and $E = \{(u, v)\}$.

3 Strategies of the rules rejection

We account for two strategies how to formalize the idea of causal rejection. They lead to the sets $reject(\mathcal{P}, s, M)$ and $rjct(\mathcal{P}, s, M)$, see below. The former has been defined for example in [1, 6], the later for example in [2].

Definition 3 Let $(\mathcal{P}, G)$ be a multidimensional dynamic logic program, where $G = (V, E)$ and $\mathcal{P} = \{\mathcal{P}_v : v \in V\}$. Let M be an interpretation, $s \in V$.

$$\begin{aligned}
reject(\mathcal{P}, s, M) &= \{r \in P_i : \exists j \in V\ \exists r' \in P_j\ (i \prec j \preceq s\ \wedge\ r \bowtie r' \\
&\quad \wedge\ M \models \{body(r), body(r'))\}\}, \\
rjct^{\mathcal{P}}(s, M) &= \emptyset \\
rjct^{\mathcal{P}}(i, M) &= \{r \in P_i : \exists j \in V\ \exists r' \in P_j \setminus rjct^{\mathcal{P}}(j, M) \\
&\quad (i \prec j \preceq s \wedge r \bowtie r' \wedge M \models \{body(r), body(r')\}\} \\
rjct(\mathcal{P}, s, M) &= \bigcup_{i \preceq s} rjct^{\mathcal{P}}(i, M)
\end{aligned}$$

A multiprogram is denoted by $\mathcal{P}$ in what follows. A graph $G = (V, E)$ is implicitly assumed.

Theorem 4 *Let $\mathcal{P}$ be a multiprogram, $s \in V$, M be an interpretation. It holds that $rjct(\mathcal{P}, s, M) \subseteq reject(\mathcal{P}, s, M)$.* □

The inclusion $reject(\mathcal{P}, s, M) \subseteq rjct(\mathcal{P}, s, M)$ does not hold for some $\mathcal{P}$, s, M:

Example 5 ([7]) Let $\mathcal{P} = P, U, P_3$ be a dynamic logic program, $1 \prec 2 \prec 3$.

$$\begin{aligned}
P &= \{a \leftarrow b, b \leftarrow\} \\
U &= \{not\ b \leftarrow a\} \\
P_3 &= \{b \leftarrow a\}
\end{aligned}$$

Let w be $\{a, b\}$. Then

$$\begin{aligned}
reject(\mathcal{P}, 3, w) &= \{b \leftarrow, not\ b \leftarrow a\} \\
rjct(\mathcal{P}, 3, w) &= \{not\ b \leftarrow a\}
\end{aligned}$$

□

The rejection done by *rjct* is a minimal one, in a reasonable sense:

Theorem 6 *Let a multi-program $\mathcal{P}$ and $s \in V$ be given. Then for each w holds that $rjct(\mathcal{P}, s, w)$ is a minimal subset of $\mathcal{P}_s$ containing at least one rule from each pair $(r, r') \in \mathcal{P} \times \mathcal{P}$ of conflicting rules, where $w \models \{body(r), body(r')\}$ and the set of all non-rejected rules is a consistent one, if each $P \in \mathcal{P}$ is consistent.* □

4 Strategies of assumptions accepting

The meaning of a program depends both on rules and on default assumptions (see Definition 1). Therefore, the approach to default assumptions accepting is an essential one for updates of logic programs. Again, two strategies are discussed. Observe, that two strategies of rules rejection may be combined with two strategies of the acceptance of default assumptions.

The first strategy is as follows: Consider a multi-program $\mathcal{P}$. The updated program consists of all rules of $\mathcal{P}$ except those rejected (according to the selected strategy). The semantics of updated programs is defined by their stable models. It means: if S is a stable model of an updated program, then S^- is the corresponding set of default assumptions.

The concepts of justified updates [5] and backward-justified updates use this strategy.

Definition 7 Let $\mathcal{P} = (\mathcal{P}_D, D)$ be a multiprogram, $s \in V$.

An interpretation M is a *justified update* of $\mathcal{P}$ at state $s \in V$ iff M is a stable model of the program $\mathcal{P}_s \setminus reject(\mathcal{P}, s, M)$. An interpretation M is a *backward-justified update* of $\mathcal{P}$ at state $s \in V$ iff M is a stable model of the program $\mathcal{P}_s \setminus rjct(\mathcal{P}, s, M)$. □

Theorem 8 ([5]) *Let $\mathcal{P}$ be a program and $s \in V$. If S is a justified update of $\mathcal{P}$ at state s, then S is its backward-justified update at s.* □

The Theorem 8 does not hold in the converse direction:

Example 9 Consider the multiprogram $\mathcal{P}$ from the Example 5. The interpretation $\{a, b\}$ is a backward-justified update of $\mathcal{P}$ at state 3, but it is not its justified update at 3. □

(Backward-)justified updates suffer from some unpleasant properties:

Example 10 ([5]) Let $\mathcal{P} = \langle P, U \rangle$, where $1 \prec 2$,

$$\begin{aligned} P &= \{a \leftarrow\} \\ U &= \{not\ a \leftarrow not\ a\} \end{aligned}$$

Both $M_1 = \{a\}$ and $M_2 = \{not\ a\}$ are justified (and backward-justified) updates of $\mathcal{P}$ at state 2.

There is no reason to accept the interpretation M_2 (more precisely, to accept the default assumption *not* a in M_2) and, consequently, to reject the fact $a \leftarrow$. Troubles are caused also by (more general) cyclic updates. □

The (implicit) policy of accepting default assumptions which is behind the (backward-)justified updates is not an adequate one. If we select an interpretation S, then the negative literals of S are accepted, whenever the condition $S = least((\mathcal{P}_s \setminus reject(\mathcal{P}, s, S)) \cup S^-)$ is satisfied. Certainly, a more subtle (explicit) policy is required. Such a policy is proposed within the second strategy of the updated program building (see a set $default(\mathcal{P}, s, M)$ defined below). The strategy is specified in the frame of the (multidimensional) dynamic logic programming [6] paradigm and it is based on the declarative semantics of dynamic[1] stable models at state s.

Definition 11 (Dynamic stable model at state s, [6]) Let $\mathcal{P} = (\mathcal{P}_D, D)$ be a multidimensional dynamic logic program, where $D = (V, E)$ and $\mathcal{P}_D = \{\mathcal{P}_v : v \in V\}$. Let M be an interpretation, A be an atom, $s \in V$. Then

$$default(\mathcal{P}, s, M) \quad = \quad \{not\ A : \neg\exists r \in \mathcal{P}_s : (head(r) = A \ \wedge \ M \models body(r))\}$$

[1] The term *dynamic stable model* is due to [2].

An interpretation M is a *dynamic stable model* of $\mathcal{P}$ at state $s \in V$, iff

$$M = least((\mathcal{P}_s \setminus reject(\mathcal{P}, s, M)) \cup default(\mathcal{P}, s, M))$$

and M is a *backward-dynamic stable model* of $\mathcal{P}$ at state $s \in V$, iff

$$M = least((\mathcal{P}_s \setminus rjct(\mathcal{P}, s, M)) \cup default(\mathcal{P}, s, M)).$$

Remark 12 If the condition $M \models \{body(r), body(r')\}$ (from the definition of *reject* or *rjct*) is simplified to $M \models body(r')$ we get an equivalent notion of dynamic stable model: rules whose body is not satisfied in M do not affect the least model. □

Theorem 13 ([2, 5]) *If S is a dynamic stable model of $\mathcal{P}$ at state s, then it is its justified update at s.* □

The converse implication doesn't hold:

Example 14 ([5]) Consider the program from the Example 10: $M_2 = \{not\ a\}$ is not a dynamic stable model of $\mathcal{P}$: $default(\mathcal{P}, 2, M_2)) = \emptyset$, but $M_2^- = M_2$. □

Theorem 15 *If S is a backward-dynamic stable model of $\mathcal{P}$ at state s, then it is its backward-justified update.* □

Also the Theorem 15 does not hold in the converse direction, see the Example 10. (Notice that for the sequences of two programs *reject* coincide with *rjct*, therefore their backward-justified updates coincide with justified updates, and their backward-dynamic stable models with dynamic stable models.)

Theorem 16 *Let $\mathcal{P}$ be a multiprogram, $s \in V$. If S is a dynamic stable model of $\mathcal{P}$ at state s then it is its backward-dynamic stable model at s.* □

The Theorem 16 does not hold in the converse direction, see again the examples 5 and 9: $w = \{a, b\}$ is not a dynamic stable model of $\mathcal{P}$ at state 3, but it is its backward-dynamic stable model.

The summary: For each given multi-program $\mathcal{P}$ holds: dynamic stable models of $\mathcal{P}$ (at each state s) create a proper subset of justified updates of $\mathcal{P}$ and of backward-dynamic stable models of $\mathcal{P}$. And both last mentioned interpretations create a proper subset of backward-justified updates.

5 Kripkean semantics

The problems with tautological and cyclic updates are not removed completely by the introduction of dynamic stable model semantics:

Example 17 ([5]) Let $\mathcal{P}$ be $\langle P, U\rangle$, where $1 \prec 2$ and

$$P = \{not\ a \leftarrow \qquad\qquad U = \{a \leftarrow a\}$$
$$a \leftarrow\}$$

$S = \{a\}$ is the (backward-)dynamic stable model of $\mathcal{P}$ at state 2.

Similarly, if $\mathcal{P}'$ is $\langle P, U'\rangle$, where $U' = \{a \leftarrow b; b \leftarrow a\}$, then $S = \{a, b\}$ is the only dynamic stable model of $\mathcal{P}'$ at state 2. □

A recent semantics, called refined dynamic stable model semantics [3] solves the problem of tautological (cyclic) updates which can resolve inconsistencies in a program by a simple straightforward method – conflicting literals in one program are rejected mutually. However, the solution holds only for sequences of programs. The problem is not resolved for the multidimensional case, see [11].

Moreover, the semantics of (refined) dynamic stable models suffers form other fundamental problems. In enables irrelevant updates, see Example 18, and – on the other hand – it is not able to recognize such conflicts between programs that are not manifested by conflicts between rules, see Example 19.

Example 18 ([2]) Let $\mathcal{P}$ be $\langle P, U\rangle$, with $1 \prec 2$, where

$$P = \{a \leftarrow b \qquad\qquad U = \{not\ b \leftarrow not\ a\}$$
$$b \leftarrow\}$$

Dynamic stable models of $\mathcal{P}$ at state 2 are $S_1 = \{a, b\}$ and $S_2 = \{not\ a, not\ b\}$. If the information from P and U is given, there is no sufficient reason to believe in S_2 and to reject the fact $b \leftarrow$. □

Suppose that we accept a "static" semantics *Sem* (for example the stable model semantics) and a "dynamic" semantics *DynSem* (for example dynamic stable model semantics). It is very natural to accept the postulate as follows: If $P \cup U$ is consistent then $Sem(P \cup U) = DynSem(\langle P, U\rangle)$. Observe that this very natural requirement is not fulfilled by dynamic stable model semantics, see Example 18 (and also by the other semantics based on the causal rejection principle).

Moreover and most importantly, there are some conflicts between the programs that are principially not solvable on the level of the conflicts between rules:

Example 19 Let U be a more preferred program than P.

$$P = \{a \leftarrow b, c\} \qquad\qquad U = \{b \leftarrow not\ a$$
$$c \leftarrow b\}$$

There is no conflict between the rules of both programs. No rule can be rejected and the meaning of $P \cup U$ cannot be updated according to the dynamic logic programming [1] paradigm. However, there is a sort of conflict between the programs (between their meanings): The literal a in the less preferred program P depends on a set of assumptions (on the set of literals $w = \{b, c\}$). On the other hand, every literal in w is dependent on a default assumption (on the literal *not* a) in the more preferred program U. Notice that there is a circular dependency of a on *not* a in $P \cup U$. The problem of circular dependency can be resolved by rejecting the less preferred dependency of a on $\{b, c\}$.

Hence, our goal is to define rejection of dependencies. We need a more rich semantic structure, in order to be able to do it. □

Our approach provides a semantic treatment of dependencies between sets of literals (belief sets). The dependencies are encoded in (rather nonstandard) Kripke structures. The intuition is as follows: if the world (or our knowledge of the world) is represented by an interpretation w then (the meaning of) a program P may be viewed as a set of transitions to other worlds, compatible, in a sense, with w. The transitions are specified as follows: if $body(r)$ is satisfied in w for some $r \in P$ then the world $w \cup \{head(r)\}$ is compatible with w, if it is consistent. It is a natural choice to require that the compatibility relation is transitive and irreflexive.

We present a simplified (but a sufficient one for our current needs) version of the definition of a Kripke structure associated with a program. For the more complicated version see [9].

Definition 20 (Kripke structure associated with a program) Let P be a program. A Kripke structure $\mathcal{K}^P$ associated with P is a a pair (W, ρ), where:

- $W = Int_{\mathcal{L}} \cup \{w_\perp\}$, W is called the set of possible worlds, $w_\perp$ is the representative of the set of all inconsistent sets of literals,
- ρ is a binary relation on $W \times W$, it is called the accessibility relation and it contains the set of all pairs (w, w'), where $w \neq w'$, satisfying exactly one of the conditions:
  1. $w' = w \cup \{head(r)\}$ for some $r \in P$ such that $w \models body(r)$,
  2. $w' = w_\perp$ iff $\exists r \in P\ (w \models body(r) \wedge not\ head(r) \in w)$.

Definition 21 If $e = (u, v) \in \rho$, it is said that e is a *ρ-edge* and u (v) is called the *source* (the *target*) of e. A *ρ-path* is a sequence σ of ρ-edges $(w_0, w_1), (w_1, w_2), \ldots, (w_{n-1}, w_n)$ in a Kripke structure $\mathcal{K}$.

We say that this σ is *rooted* in w_0 (also w_0-rooted). If there is no ρ-edge (w_n, w) in $\mathcal{K}$, we say that σ is *terminated* in w_n, w_n is called a *terminal* of σ. □

Paths are usually denoted by a shorthand of the form $\langle w_0, w_1, \ldots, w_n \rangle$. We are now ready to state (in terms of nodes and paths in $\mathcal{K}^P$) conditions of being a stable model of a program P.

Definition 22 (Distinguished paths, good worlds) Let P be a program, σ be a ρ-path $\langle w_0, \ldots, w_n \rangle$ in $\mathcal{K}^P$. We say that σ is *correctly rooted*, if $w_0 \subseteq \mathcal{D}$.

A correctly rooted ρ-path σ terminated in a total interpretation w is called a *distinguished* path and w is called a *good world.* □

Theorem 23 *Let P be a program, $\mathcal{K}^P$ be the Kripke structure associated with P.*
Then w_n is a good world in $\mathcal{K}^P$ iff it is a stable model of P. □

Remark 24 If $\mathcal{D}$ is a terminal in $\mathcal{K}^P$, it is the (only) stable model of P. The trivial sequence $\langle \mathcal{D} \rangle$ is correctly rooted and terminated in $\mathcal{D}$. Suppose that a total interpretation $w \neq \mathcal{D}$ is a stable model of P, we get $(\mathcal{D}, w_\perp) \in \rho$. □

6 Updates of Kripke structures

While the semantics presented in Sections 3 and 4 are based on rules rejection, our semantics of updates is based on a rejection of some edges in Kripke structures. In other words, the updates change the compatibility relation between possible worlds.

A removal of some edges may be interpreted as overriding the corresponding dependencies between belief sets. On the other hand, connecting the edges from one Kripke structure to the edges from another may be interpreted as an enrichment of the dependencies between belief sets.

Suppose two programs,[2] P and U, and the Kripke structures, $\mathcal{K}^P = (W, \rho^P)$ and $\mathcal{K}^U = (W, \rho^U)$, associated with P and U, respectively. Moreover, U (the updating program) is more preferred than P (the original program).

Our approach enables to recognize conflicts between programs even if there are no conflicts between rules. In such cases some edges are rejected, but there is no reason to reject a rule. We regard this as an essential observation:

[2] In this paper only the elementary case of two programs is considered (because of the limited size). The more general theory is presented in [9].

Example 25 Consider the Example 19. We "translate" its idea into Kripke structures. The world $\{a, b, c\}$ (and, consequently, the literal a) is dependent on the world $w = \{b, c\}$ in the less preferred Kripke structure $\mathcal{K}^P$. Similarly, the world $w_\perp$ is dependent on the world $w' = \{not\ a, b, c\}$ in the less preferred structure and w' is dependent on the world $\{not\ a\}$ in the more preferred Kripke structure $\mathcal{K}^U$. We do not want to accept the circular dependency of a on $not\ a$, therefore we propose to reject the (less) edge $(\{not\ a, b, c\}, w_\perp) \in \rho^P$ (leading to inconsistency). □

We intend to define an operation $\oplus$ on Kripke structures. The resulting Kripke structure $\mathcal{K}^{U\oplus P} = \mathcal{K}^U \oplus \mathcal{K}^P = (W, \rho^{U\oplus P})$ should be based on $\mathcal{K}^U$ while a reasonable part of $\mathcal{K}^P$ is preserved. Notice that the set of nodes, W, remains unchanged, but some ρ^P-edges should be rejected.

Definition 26 (Attacked edges) Let $W = Int_\mathcal{L}$. Let $\tau_1, \tau_2 \subseteq W \times W$ be binary relations. Let L be a literal.

We say that $e = (u, u \cup \{L\}) \in \tau_1$ is *attacked* by $e' = (u, u \cup \{not\ L\}) \in \tau_2$. □

Of course, there is a symmetry: if e is attacked by e' then e' is attacked by e, too. Nevertheless, we want to prefer "one side". We intend to reject an edge from ρ^P if it is attacked by an edge in ρ^U.

Sometimes it is needed to reject a ρ^P-edge of the form $(w, w_\perp)$, see the Example 19. In this case the analysis is a little bit more complicated.[3]

The basic rule is as follow: if $(w, w_\perp) \in \rho^P$ and w occurs on a ρ_2-path, then $(w, w_\perp)$ should be rejected, if the rejection is not blocked. The idea of blocking is illustrated in the next Example.

Example 27 (Blocking of rejections) Let $\mathcal{P}$ be $\langle P, U\rangle$.

$$P = \{a \leftarrow \qquad\qquad U = \{not\ a \leftarrow not\ b$$
$$b \leftarrow \qquad\qquad\quad not\ b \leftarrow not\ c$$
$$c \leftarrow\} \qquad\qquad\quad not\ c \leftarrow not\ a\}$$

Let $w_1 = \{not\ a, not\ b, not\ c\}$. There are three ρ^U-paths to w_1. One of them is $\sigma = \langle\{not\ a\}, \{not\ a, not\ b\}, w_1\rangle$. Notice that $e_1 = (\{w_1, w_\perp) \in \rho^P$.

Observe that the ρ^U-paths mentioned above are rooted in default assumptions (in$\{not\ a\}$ or in $\{not\ b\}$ or in $\{not\ c\}$). There is no support for these assumptions. But the facts from P should override default assumptions from U. Therefore, the rejection of e_1 by σ should be considered to be blocked.

The facts from P are conflicting with respect to each root of a ρ^U-path to w_1, w_1 is not supported in U. On the contrary, $(\{not\ a\}, w_\perp), (\{not\ b\}, w_\perp), (\{not\ c\}, w_\perp) \in \rho^P$ and there is no reason to reject them. □

The idea of rejections blocking is the fundamental one.

Definition 28 (Blocking) Let programs P and U be given. The corresponding Kripke structures are denoted by $\mathcal{K}_P$ and $\mathcal{K}_U$. Let $(w_1, w_\perp) \in \rho^P$. Let L_1 and L_2 be conflicting literals.

A ρ^U-edge (w_0, w_1) is *blocked* iff $L_1 \in w_1$ and there is a ρ^P-path from $\emptyset$ to w such that $L_2 \in w$. □

Remark 29 Notice that Definition 28 is sufficiently general: if a literal L_1 from w_0 is conflicting with a literal L_2 supported (by a path form $\emptyset$ in $\mathcal{K}_P$ (as in Example 27) then also $L_1 \in w_1$. □

[3]More motivations and examples are presented in [9].

Definition 30 (Overriding) A ρ^U-edge $e = (w_0, w_1)$ *overrides* a ρ^P-edge $(w_1, w_\perp)$ if e is not blocked. □

Definition 31 (Rejected edges) Consider $\mathcal{K}^P = (W, \rho^P)$ and $\mathcal{K}^U = (W, \rho^U)$. We say that $e \in \rho^P$ is rejected, if

- e is attacked by some $e' \in \rho^U$,
- or there is a ρ^U-edge $e' = (w_0, w_1)$, overriding $e = (w_1, w_\perp) \in \rho^P$.

The set of rejected edges is denoted by $Rejected_{\rho^U}(\rho^P)$. □

Definition 32 (Update on Kripke structures)

$$\begin{aligned} \mathcal{K}^U \oplus \mathcal{K}^P &= \mathcal{K}^{U \oplus P} = (W, \rho^{U \oplus P}) \\ \rho^{U \oplus P} &= \rho^U \cup (\rho^P \setminus (Rejected_{\rho^U}(\rho^P)) \square \end{aligned}$$

The causal rule rejection principle is satisfied in updated Kripke structures:

Proposition 33 ([7]) *Let $\mathcal{P} = \langle P, U \rangle$ be a multiprogram, where $1 \prec 2$. Let $w \in Int_{\mathcal{L}}$, $r \in P$ and $w \models body(r)$.*

If $e = (w, w \cup \{head(r)\}) \in Rejected_{\rho^U}(\rho^P)$ then $r \in reject(\mathcal{P}, 2, w)$ and $r \in rjct(\mathcal{P}, 2, w)$.

Remark 34 ([7]) The converse of the Proposition 33 does not hold. If a rule is rejected, some edges "generated" by this rule may be not rejected. Let P be $\{a \leftarrow\}$, U be $\{not\ a \leftarrow b\}$ and w be $\{a, b\}$. Then $(\emptyset, \{a\}) \notin Rejected_{\rho^U}(\rho^P)$ but the rule $a \leftarrow$ is both in $reject(\mathcal{P}, 2, w)$ and in $rjct(\mathcal{P}, 2, w)$.

Therefore, the rejection defined within the frame of Kripkean semantics is more sensitive (able to make a more fine distinguishing) than a rejection of rules. □

Remark 35 There is no analogy of the Proposition 33 for the edges with the target $w_\perp$. It may happen that $(w, w_\perp) \in Rejected_{\rho^U}(\rho^P)$, but there is no rule $r \in P \cap reject(\mathcal{P}, 2, w)$ (and in $P \cap rjct(\mathcal{P}, 2, w)$) (even if P is consistent): According to the Definition 30 there is a rule $r \in P$ such that $w \models body(r)$ and $not\ head(r) \in w$. However, $not\ head(r)$ may be not introduced by a rule from U, it may be in the root of each path to w, see the Example 19.

Of course (similarly as in the Remark 34), if a rule is rejected, it is possible that $(w, w_\perp) \notin Rejected_{\rho^U}(\rho^P)$, where the transition from w to $w_\perp$ is generated by the rejected rule.

Problems with tautological and cyclic updates are removed in the Kripkean semantics. Tautologies do not influence Kripke structures.

Proposition 36 *Let P be program. Let $P' = P \cup \{r\}$, where $head(r) \in body(r)$.*

Then $\mathcal{K}^P = \mathcal{K}^{P'}$. □

A more general property:

Proposition 37 *Let $\mathcal{K}_\mathcal{P}$ be the Kripke structure associated with a program P. Let $P' = P \cup \{r\}$, and for each w on a ρ^P-path holds: if $w \models body(r)$ then $head(r) \in w$.*

Then $\mathcal{K}^P = \mathcal{K}^{P'}$. □

The following theorem shows that cycles from U do not cause an update of $\mathcal{K}_P$: paths generated by cycles are terminated in $\mathcal{K}^{P \oplus U}$ by $w_\perp$ if there is a conflict between a rule in P and a rule in the cycle of U:

Theorem 38 *Let for all $r \in U$ there is a $r' \in U$ such that $head(r) \in body(r')$. Let $w = \{head(r) : r \in U\}$.*

If there is a ρ^P-path $\langle \emptyset, \ldots, u \rangle$ such that not $head(r) \in u$ for some $r \in U$ then for each w' such that $w \subseteq w'$ holds that $(w', w_\perp) \in \mathcal{K}^{P \oplus U}$.

Notice now that good worlds of $\mathcal{K}^{U \oplus P}$ play the crucial role in the update semantics.

Finally, Kripkean semantics do not suffer from irrelevant updates of the type illustrated by Example 18 and it is able to recognize the conflicts not distinguishable by semantics based on the causal rejection principle. Details see in [9]. Our strategy of rejections is more close to those of backwards-semantics.

7 Conclusions

The results of the paper:

- a classification of the semantics based on the rule rejection principle is given,
- a Kripkean semantics of logic program updates is presented,
- the semantics enables to solve the problem of tautological, cyclic and irrelevant updates and it is able to recognize conflicts indistinguishable according to the causal rejection principle.

Presented Kripkean semantics is based on (justified by) principles expressed in postulates of [10].

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